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Abstract
The spread of free/libre open source software (FLOSS) represents one of the most important developments in 
the Information Technology (IT) industry in recent years. Within the context of a knowledge-based economy, 
this sort of approach appears exemplary for a growing number of industrial activities in which the amount of  
knowledge that has to be mastered is too large for a single agent, however powerful. Considering knowledge  
as a mutual resource requires a rethinking of the value chain concept, since cash flow is derived from use of  
the  knowledge  base  (services,  complementary  products),  not  from  the  knowledge  itself.  In  a  classical 
industrial economics perspective, this reshaping of the value chain must be analyzed not only at the global  
ecosystem level (who produces what, between firms and universities, users and producers, etc.), but also at  
the industry level (once the industry’s role has been identified, how does it organize itself?). Various points  
of view have been proposed, but researchers have generally studied either the involvement of firms in a  
community or the integration of FLOSS into their market strategy, but not both. In this article, we argue for a  
more structured and global analysis, based on the tools of industrial economics, and thus starting from the 
basic  conditions  of  the  computer  market  and  of  the  buyers’  competence  in  software  development  (the 
“dominant user’s skill”). This conceptual framework helps to distinguish the different types of corporate 
behavior we see in the FLOSS ecosystem and more specifically their varying degrees of involvement.
'Free'/'libre' or 'open source' software, industrial economics, dominant user's skill, 
specificity of the assets.
Résumé
Ces dernières années, la diffusion du logiciel libre, ou open source, représente une des évolutions les plus 
importantes de l’industrie des technologies de l’information. Dans un contexte d’une économie basée sur la 
connaissance,  ce  modèle  apparaît  comme  exemplaire  pour  de  nombreuses  industries,  où  la  quantité  de 
connaissance  qu’il  faut  maîtriser  est  trop grande pour  être  maîtrisée  par  un seul  agent,  même puissant.  
Considérer la connaissance comme une ressource partagée implique de repenser le concept de chaîne de  
valeur,  car  la  richesse  est  générée  par  les  usages  de  cette  base  de  connaissance  (services,  produits 
complémentaires)  et  non  plus  de  la  connaissance  par  elle-même.  Si  l’on  se  place  dans  une perspective 
d’économie  industrielle  “classique”,  cette  restructuration  de  la  valeur  doit  être  étudiée  au  niveau  de 
l’écosystème global  (qui  produit  quoi  entre  les  entreprises  et  les  universités,  entre les  utilisateurs  et  les 
producteurs, etc.), mais aussi au niveau industriel (une fois que le rôle de l’industrie est compris, comment  
celle-ci s’organise). De nombreuses explications ont été proposées, mais, la plupart du temps, les chercheurs 
étudient soit l’implication des entreprises dans les communautés, soit l’intégration du logiciel libre dans leurs  
stratégies commerciales,  rarement les deux. Dans cet  article,  nous défendons l’idée d’une approche plus 
structurée et globale, partant des conditions initiales du marché de l’informatique et des compétences des  
acheteurs en terme de développement logiciel  (les compétences de l’utilisateur “représentatif”). Ce cadre 
conceptuel  permet  d’éclairer  les  différents  comportements  des  entreprises  que  l’on  constate  dans 
l’écosystème libre, et spécifiquement la variation de leur implication.
Logiciel libre, économie industrielle, compétence de l'utilisateur représentatif, spécificité des actifs.
 JEL: L11, L15, L22, L86
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1  Introduction.
 “Free”/“libre” or “open source” software (FLOSS) is software whose source-code, which is the explicit 
expression  of  the  programming work,  remains  openly  accessible.  Until  recently,  it  was  considered  that 
FLOSS only concerned programmers interested in building and sharing a base of programs developed for  
their own needs (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Demazière et al., 2006). Today, 
open source software is increasingly integrated into many commercial offers (e.g., Novell buying Ximian and 
SuSE, Sun open-sourcing its operating system, IBM open sourcing its development tool software Eclipse, 
and even Microsoft, who recently decided to distribute some of its software products under open license2). 
Iansiti and Richards (2006) identified, amongst the various FLOSS projects, a “money-driven cluster” where 
“IT vendors’ motives are economic. In this cluster, significant investments have been made in projects that 
will serve as complementary assets to drive revenues to vendors’ core businesses”. Lakhani and Wolf (2005), 
analyzing the results of an investigation of 684 software developers involved in 287 FLOSS projects, found 
that “a majority of [their] respondents are skilled and experienced professionals working in IT-related jobs,  
with approximately 40 percent being paid to participate in the FLOSS project”. 
This paradoxical situation, in which commercial business relies on the existence and durability of non-
market activities, is a challenge to industrial economic theory. It clearly has something to do with issues of  
“coopetition” (Brandenburger  and Nalebuff, 1996). As in any cooperative agreement devoted to technology 
or knowledge development, agents pool assets together in a “pre-competitive” phase and share the fruit of 
their efforts before returning to competition (Crémer et al., 1990; Bhattacharya and Guriev, 2006). A FLOSS 
project, on the contrary, is an open game in which the list of players is not bounded ex-ante by a cooperative  
agreement  and  the  product  is  a  public  good that  cannot  be  privately  appropriated  by  the  players.  This 
corresponds more to the formation of a consortium for the production of a standard3. 
FLOSS can be considered as an extreme case of “open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003), defined as “a 
paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and  
external paths to market, as they look to advance their technology” (Chesbrough, 2006). In this paradigm, the 
question is to understand which part of intellectual property players may have to open up and which part they 
must control to build their business (Harison and Koski, 2010; Henkel, 2006).
In each period of the history of computers, certain players have become dominant by controlling some 
specific assets while others were opened up: with the 360 series, in the 1960s, IBM controlled the computer,  
but allowed a degree of freedom in the design of independent software (and software producers); with the 
PC, Microsoft and Intel controlled (and still control) the operating system and a key hardware component, the 
microprocessor, but the design of the machine was opened up and allowed competition in that part of the  
market. Can FLOSS be considered as a new form of industrial organization for the computer industry?  If so,  
which asset(s) should FLOSS-based computer firms control? 
Industrial  economic  theory  (Shepherd,  1990)  explains  that  an  industry  is  characterized  by  the  basic 
conditions of each kind of activity: characteristics of the products, of the users - hence of the demand -, but 
also of the legal environment (intellectual property protection, for instance). These basic conditions shape the 
main aspects of the market structure (source of added value, competitive advantages, barriers to entry) and 
the nature of the competition (firms’ behavior in terms of price, position, etc.) The efficiency of the firms  
(their  performance)  depends on their  strategy (behavior,  organization)  being  well-adapted  to  the  market 
structure, and on their capacity to reshape this market structure - by increasing the barriers to entry, for 
instance (Tirole, 1989).
More precisely, however, this has to do with Teece’s theory of technological innovation and which part 
of “specialized assets”, more or less dependent on the innovation, a firm must control to succeed on the  
market (Teece, 1986). In fact, we argue that FLOSS corresponds to the emergence in the computer industry  
of  the problem of managing what  Teece et al.  (1997) called “dynamic capabilities”,  i.e.,  the continuous 
evolution of demand and innovation4.
2 http://solutions.journaldunet.com/0404/040407_microsoft.shtml
3 What we mean is that a player offers a standard by developing software that the other players can adopt 
and  help  to  develop.  This  “unilateral”  adoption  is  usually  called  ‘bandwagon’  in  the  literature  on  
standards (see for instance Farrell and Saloner, 1985). 
4 Dynamic  capability  is  defined  as  “the  firm's  ability  to  integrate,  build  and  reconfigure  internal  and  
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So in this article, we propose a global analysis of the computer industry and its evolution to explain the  
emergence of FLOSS as a form of industrial organization, before looking at firms’ business to identify the  
particular asset firms sell in a FLOSS environment.
The article is organized as follows: in section 2 we look at FLOSS on a “macro” industrial level, to  
determine what,  in  the  history of  the  computer  industry  and  its  evolution,  can explain the  diffusion  of 
FLOSS. In section 3 we discuss the place of FLOSS as a source of competitive advantage and we introduce 
the role of the users. In section 4 we discuss of the variety of involvements of firms in FLOSS  and how these  
level and mode of involvement can be explained by the type of users likely to be found in each sub-sector of  
the IT industry. Then we conclude on perspectives for open innovation regimes.
2  The evolution of the computer industry.
2.1  Characteristics of the evolution. 
The evolution of the computer industry since its emergence in the middle of the last century has been studied  
by Genthon (1995), Dréan (1996), Langlois and Mowery (1996), Mowery (1996) and Steinmueller (1996).  
We can distinguish three main periods, each starting with a new technology that made possible the design of  
a new offer for new users. But in each case, the owner of the key asset of the technology was dominant. 
Zimmermann  (1995)  and  Gérard-Varet  and  Zimmermann  (1985)  distinguished  three  stages  in  the 
construction of a complex good: the components (called “elementary technologies”), which are used to create 
“generic products” or platforms, which have to be tuned to meet certain uses (called “characteristics of use”). 
The passage from one stage to another is a technological act that must be industrialized. The first (from  
component to product) is called “technologies of architecturing” and the second (from generic product to 
usable product) is called “technologies of use”.  The history of the computer industry is  the story of the  
successive emergence of the dominant design and of the industrial organization to produce it for these two 
“technological acts”. 
A dominant technological concept for a dominant demand...
In  the  first  period  (mid  1940s  to  mid  1960s),  there  was  no  real  differentiation  between  hardware  and 
software, and computers were ’unique’. They were research products, built for a unique project. In this pre-
paradigmatic stage, the users were of the “Von Hippel” type (that we denote VH), who may act as “sources  
of  innovation”  (von  Hippel,  1988,  1986),  able  to  contribute  to  hardware  development  by  proposing 
improvements  or  modifications,  developing  it  by  themselves  or  at  least  able  to  design  the  technical 
specifications. 
In the second period (early 1960s to early 1980s), thanks to technological progress (miniaturization of  
transistors, compilers and operating systems), the scope of use extended in two directions: a reduction in the  
size  and  price  of  computers,  which  increased  the  number  of  organizations able  to  afford  them,  and an 
increase in computing capacities, allowing the same computer to serve different uses. But the main evolution 
was initiated by IBM, with the release of the 360 series, the first family of computers sharing the same  
operating system. This was the first dominant design of the industry. The computer had become a "classical" 
good, to be changed once no longer efficient or too old, but without losing investments made in software, 
because as the program evolves, grows in size, or serves a growing number of users, you only have to move 
to more powerful hardware.
This allowed computers to reach a new category of the demand, by becoming tools for the centralized 
processing of information for organizations (statistics, payment of salaries, etc.), firms. And over the course  
of this period, the size of organizations having access to this tool decreased. Users were no longer able to 
contribute to the hardware, but they developed strong skills in software development.
The  third  period  began  in  the  late  1970s,  with  the  arrival  of  the  microprocessor.  The  dominant 
technological concept and design were in the organization of PC production, where the hardware architecture 
has been made public and open for competition, but with one single operating system and microprocessor. 
This proved to be the most efficient way to meet demand in terms of both innovation and price: there are less  
external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997).
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compatibility problems with programs that are designed for one single architecture, but users are no longer 
tied  to  one  computer  producer,  and  that  increases  the  competition.  The  second  evolution  in  design  is  
“package programs”. Programs were no longer developed for a single user, but the same program could be 
packaged and distributed to different people or organizations, in the same way as for other tangible goods. 
What had happened in the previous period in terms of hardware design now happened for software, with the 
emergence of a dominant design. Once again the scope of use extended in two directions (increase in power 
and  reduction  in  size  and  price  of  low-end  computers).  The  third  period  is  that  of  personal,  firstly 
professional and now private information processing. Initially dominated by “Kogut-Metiu Users” (KM) 5, 
who are not able to contribute to software development but who are innovation takers and sensitive to the  
technical quality of the offer, the market has growingly dominated by “naive users” (N). These latter are not 
endowed with noticeable technical skills and are only price sensitive 6.
Specialized assets and control of the industry.
Since the computer was at that time a tool for specialists, with each project allowing producers and users to  
better understand the possibilities of such machines, the first period was dominated by learning by using,  
with significant R&D costs. The more one participated in projects, the more able one became to propose 
innovations for the next project, thanks to the knowledge accumulated. This explains the quick emergence of 
seven dominant firms (in the USA). 
In the second period, this learning-by-using effect did not disappear, as users were able to keep their  
home-made programs while changing their hardware. This possibility also created the dominant increasing 
return to adoption effect (Arthur, 1989): technological interrelations. As, factually, a program was developed  
for and worked with one single operating system, it became difficult for a customer to break the commercial  
relation, once initiated, with a producer. In return, this customer no longer even needed to understand the  
hardware part of the machine. The second period was initiated by IBM, and at the end of the period, IBM  
was the dominant firm (even having to  face an antitrust  case in the US), although newcomers,  HP and  
Digital,  had gained significant  positions with mini-computers.  If  the innovation resided in the operating 
system, the specialized asset of the period was the distribution network, as you needed to convince customers 
to  adopt  your  technology  to  develop  their  programs.  Once  that  had  been  achieved,  technological 
interrelations meant that these customers would incur substantial costs if they switched to another family run  
by another operating system. And with more customers, not only could they invest more in R&D to develop 
the  efficiency  of  their  computer  family,  but  they  could  also  spend  more  on  marketing  to  capture  new 
customers. And the efficiency of the machines was precisely what the second-period dominant user wanted. 
So once again, this favored a concentration in manufacturing business, even if on different offers. 
The interrelation effect has not disappeared in the third period. But it is dominated by economy of scope,  
principally because of the development of standardized programs, running on few architectures, reducing 
development costs (on that particular point, see Mowery, 1996). Of course, as in the previous period, the 
winners in the computer segment were those who controlled the key elements of the computer, central in  
terms  of  technological  interrelation:  operating  systems  still,  but  also  micro-processors.  They  were  the  
companies that benefited most from the economies of scale, as competition brought prices down in other  
sectors,  in particular  for the machines which had been a source of high profit before,  but also for other 
components. But new winners in software packages emerged, in more or less broad niche markets. SAP,  
Oracle and Business Objects are classic examples of the successful newcomers of this period. The access to 
customers and their needs was the co-specialized asset, as computers had been in the previous period. Once 
the customer has invested in a software technology, he is tied to that technology by investment in learning.  
And  the  more  customers  it  has,  the  more  firms  can  invest  in  R&D  to  develop  the  efficiency  or  the  
functionality of their platforms, and the more they can spend on marketing to capture new customers and/or 
their feedback to improve the product7.
In a nutshell, what history teaches us is that in the computer industry, technological evolution allows the  
construction of new offers, new dominant designs, better-suited to meet new demand characteristics. And 
each time this happens, the users and their feedback are the key co-specialized asset that firms must control 
5  In reference to the concept of “frontier-users” proposed by Kogut and Metiu (2001). 
6 We use here a typology of users close to the one defined by Gérard-Varet and Zimmermann (1985), 
distinguishing between so-called naive, sophisticated and designer users, but here our preoccupation is  
rather oriented to the capability of these users to contribute to software improvement.
7 For a detailed analysis of the strategies of these firms, see Cusumano (2004).
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to succeed in promoting offers based on new technologies. This remains true for the computer industry of 
today.
2.2  The current industrial organization.
Hardware.
When speaking of computers, we think about machines that are more or less dedicated to specific uses. At  
one  extreme,  computers  can  be  used  for  a  wide  scope of  applications  provided by the  software  that  is 
acquired and installed on them. At the other extreme, video game consoles or multimedia players are devoted 
to a single range of applications. In between, mobile devices like PDAs or mobile phones are built to support  
a growing number of applications8. 
Vertical competitive advantage is given by better performances/cost ratios (for instance cheaper laptops 
or better computation capacities for servers or high quality laptops), while horizontal differentiation is based 
on the integration of new features and high performance tools (e.g. Samsung’s folding cell phone display), or 
on market segmentation through hard-soft-content bundling on new features or applications (e.g. “Mario 
Brothers” video games only being available on Nintendo machines).
But in terms of the purpose of these machines, and thus the skill of the people buying them, the structure 
of the markets and of the competition varies. We will take the example of the computer market to illustrate  
this. 
1. Servers are intended to manage, deliver and protect information on the networks. They must be high-
performance,  stable  and  compatible  with  network  standards.  They  are  bought  by  VH  users.  
Microcomputers (with a growing market share for laptop computers) are bought by end users, mainly 
as personal computers. In the server market, several Unix systems still exist, and this is a case of  
horizontal differentiation as they are not compatible, so users have to choose between them. For high 
end customers or needs, mainframes still exist with dedicated operating systems. In the case of the 
open source Unix, some users prefer BSD (free, open or net) to Linux. 
So even if a growing share of the market is supplied by PC servers running either Linux or Microsoft, 
it is clear that quality, purpose and niche market strategies are possible, because users are able to  
evaluate the performance and the suitability to their needs, and are ready to pay for that. 
2. In  the  personal  computer  market,  Apple  has  a  marginal  market  share,  as  does  Linux,  and  the 
Windows-Intel couple dominates the market. IBM sold its PC division to Lenovo in 2004, because it  
was no longer profitable after Compaq cut prices in the mid 1990s, and the difficulties of Dell today9 
prove that the PC market is dominated by a price war. This is not surprising, as the dominant user is  
naive and thus only price sensitive. 
The consequence is that  firms are continuously seeking to  reduce their  costs and prices,  as  it  is  
difficult for them to differentiate horizontally. 
Software and service.
Today, according to  Cusumano (2004,  chap. 2),  the application market  can be divided into service and  
product, and for the product side into business specialized offers (which we will call “package offers”) and 
global, “platform offers”. We will follow his distinction.
Package offers.
 The practice of combined offers, or packages, integrating a standard base and customized services has made 
its mark in the field of professional solutions, for company management systems (ERP, whose symbolic  
model is SAP), IT tools ("middleware" applications, compilers, development tools such as those proposed by 
the Ilog company), and the solutions specific to a branch or profession (such as the subsequent version of  
8 This distinction between specialized and generalist devices is evolving, as Sony intends its PS3 to be the 




computer-aided design proposed by the company Dassault Systems). 
The producer sells “three A services” (Jullien and Zimmermann, 2006): quality Assurance, Adaptation 
(more or less fast) to the user’s needs, and Assistance with using the tool. This is the model of “sustained 
technical capacity” (Delaunay and Gadray, 1992; Gadray, 1996). The core competence of the firm here is to 
make the product evolve following line with the needs of the users, but to make this evolution “sustainable” 
(i.e., ensuring the product remains appropriable and bug-free). If these tools are professional, users are skilled 
enough to express their requirements (for instance, if they are doctors, that the product is up to date regarding 
drugs and drug interactions). But they are not always skilled enough in computer science to develop these  
requirements by themselves, or even to translate them into tender specifications. Here, it is the content of the  
users’ feedback that may vary according to their computer skills.
Platform manufacturers.
 They are probably the most studied. These software publishers have broadened the scope of their offer either 
by supplying a variety of application tools  that  can be combined with their  core product or  by offering 
multiple  versions  of  the  latter.  This  enables  them  to  better  meet  users’  specific  needs  while  keeping 
production costs down. The archetypal example of such a “platform strategy” is Microsoft, which now offers 
different versions of its operating system for servers, corporate users and private individuals, as does its 
open-source competitor RedHat. The same kind of strategy is followed by Oracle, which sells professional  
applications developed on its database technology, and which has recently bought BEA and SUN, after other 
takeovers,  to enlarge its  applications portfolio.  Another example is  provided by Symbian in the field of  
operating systems (OS) for mobile applications. 
In a nutshell, they are involved in a classic arbitration over standards10: to attract the maximum number of 
users to the platform in order to attract the maximum number of application producers, and vice versa. The 
history of Linux distribution publishers is another example of the importance of user skills in the creation of a 
market. RedHat, SuSE and Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft) were among the first commercial players to 
enter the market using FLOSS. This could be seen as obvious on a mass market with rather naive users and 
significant price-based competition. But today, the retail store sales of OS packages represent a negligible 
part  of the revenue of such firms11,  and a major  share is  targeted on the industrial  market.  This can be 
explained by the development  of  broadband connection.  But  more than that,  user  skills  matter.  PCs are 
shipped with a pre-installed OS, and few buyers are skilled enough to install a different one. And they have 
little incentive to do so, since the existing OS has already been paid for with the computer. On the emerging 
OS for PC/server market, things work differently. Most of the users, of VH or KM type, are aware of the  
technical issues involved in installing and configuring an OS. It is also easier to buy a machine without an 
operating system installed. FLOSS gives them access to a more open and more adaptable Unix-like operating 
system than they could find in the traditional Unix offer, and they are able to choose the Unix they prefer. So, 
even if they are less price sensitive, FLOSS-based servers may help to differentiate vertically (better quality  
over price ratio) and horizontally (with the existence of niche Unix).
Service companies.
 The largest ones (IBM, Cap Gemini) endeavor to develop a global approach to IS and company organization  
(by acquiring strategic consultancy companies such as Ernst & Young for Cap Gemini), while remaining less 
dependent  on  one  type  of  software,  so  as  to  be  able  to  adapt  to  the  constraints  and  to  the  current  
circumstances  of  these  customers.  But  the  retail  service  companies  behave in  the  same way,  supplying 
infrastructure  on  a  smaller,  more  local  scale  (maintenance  of  a  single  server,  instead  of  a  global  
infrastructure), either at a more specialized level, for example in terms of sector (e.g. maintenance services  
for the food-processing industry), or on a more reduced software base (distributors-installers-adapters of one 
of the platforms; these are Microsoft, Oracle, or RedHat "certified" companies). The vocation of all these  
companies is to develop, in the customer’s interest, individualized solutions and to support these solutions.
10 On standard theories, see the discussions by Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1994), Teece (1986), Langlois 
and Robertson (1992, 1995), and for a review of literature, West (2003, 2004).
11 RedHat  stopped  this  activity  (see  financial  report  2006,  p.  31);  the  consumer  market  (including 
distributors, OEM sales, e-commerce and Club) represented 2.54 million euros (45% of the total earnings) 
showing a 23.4% decrease for Mandriva in the 2005-2006 fiscal year; SuSE has been bought by Novell,  
so these revenues are diluted. 
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We are approaching what Delaunay and Gadray (1992) and Gadray (1996) described as the "provision of  
human capacities", in the sense that what makes their singularity (or their core competence) is that they bring 
together a team of specialists not only in different software but also in their customers’ activities. In the 
following,  we  will  call  this  “architect  strategy”.  In  other  words,  the  efficiency  of  these  firms  lies  in 
producing tender specifications that meet their clients’ needs. If these companies are technical agnostics, in 
that they have to install the tools their clients need (or want), it is obvious that the greater their mastery of a  
tool, the easier its  adaptation is and the easier their job is.  This widens the strategy field,  as firms may  
differentiate  vertically  (increasing  the number  of  tools  mastered or  the  number  of  professional  domains  
covered), but also horizontally, specializing in one domain or software, as do SAP consultants. But in any 
case, once again, the more computer-skilled their clients are, the easier the discussion will be (De Bandt, 
1998).
Actually, the Internet has already impacted these specializations, pushing firms to include more services  
in their offers or even to design new ways of selling software-based applications, such as SaaS (software as a  
service) (Cusumano, 2004, pp 86-127; Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz, 2007). 
2.3  Internet innovation, a new phase for the industry.
During the 1990s, with the arrival of the Internet, the principal technical evolution in information technology 
was,  of  course,  the  generalization  of  computer  networking,  both  inside  and  outside  organizations.  
Miniaturization also led to the appearance of a new range of "nomad" products ("organizers" (Psion and 
Palm), music players, mobile phones). This is in line with the constant evolution of information technology 
products. We have gone from a single machine, dedicated to one task known in advance and reserved for the 
entire organization, to multiple, linked machines which are used to carry out different tasks, varying over 
time, and which are integrated within various organizations. Networking, exchanging between heterogeneous 
systems and communication between these machines have all become crucial.
Thus, because of the spread of the Internet and the growth of exchange outside the organization, network  
externalities have become the most important source of increasing returns to adoption. 
Within  client  firms,  the  demand has  become more  and  more  heterogeneous  with the  networking  of 
various systems and the need for users working in the firm to share the same tools. Software programs (and 
more particularly, software packages) have to be adapted to the needs and knowledge of every individual  
without losing the benefit of economies of scale, in other words the standardization of the programs on which 
the solution is based. It is then logical that client firms should seek more open solutions, which guarantee 
them greater  control.  For  example,  what  the  Internet  did  was  not  to  offer  a  "protocol"  for  the  simple  
transmission of data, since this already existed, but to offer a protocol that was simple and flexible enough to  
impose itself as a standard for exchange.
In parallel with this evolution, software program technologies have also evolved (Horn, 2000b, pp 126-
128): the arrival of object programming languages (C++, Java) allowed existing software components to be  
re-used. This has led to the concept of “modular software programs”: the idea is to develop an ensemble of  
small software programs (modules or software components), which each have a specific function. They can 
be  associated  with  and  used  on  any  machine,  since  their  communication  interfaces  are  standard.  What 
characterizes the technological evolution of software is thus the increasing interdependence between software 
programs, while the software components that are re-used are becoming increasingly refined and specialized 
(Zimmermann, 1998). This system can only function if components are indeed re-usable, that is to say, if  
producers agree on a mechanism to standardize interfaces and to ensure the stability of these standards over 
time.
This  led  Horn  (2004)  to  assert  that  we  have  entered  a  new  phase  in  production:  "mass  custom-made 
production", increasing the service part of packaged software sales. Judging by the past, this probably heralds 
an evolution in the business models and structure of the industry. And as already explained (Dang Nguyen 
and Pénard, 1999; Genthon and Phan, 1999; Jullien, 1999), the spread of FLOSS is consubstantial with the 
spread of the Internet. 
3.  FLOSS as the new frontier for the computer industry 
organization? 
FLOSS can be a source of competitive advantage for firms that take part in or lead its development, but the 
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nature and level of these firms' involvement varies considerably from one market segment to another. Our  
main argument here is that this variation can be explored by taking into account the characteristics of the 
consumers addressed in each market segment, and more particularly their level of skill. The more skilled the 
users are,  the easier  it  is  to introduce horizontal differentiation to meet their  needs more precisely,  thus 
creating niche markets. Conversely, when users are too computer illiterate, competition is restricted to prices 
and this limits firms' investment. 
Internet tools were developed in universities, and distributed under free licenses (BSD, for the most): NCSA 
Web server, the Apache ancestor, Sendmail, Bind... At the beginning of the spread of the Internet within 
organizations (firms, administrations), servers were installed by engineers who had discovered these tools at 
university,  sometimes without any significant budget.  They installed what they knew at the lowest cost:  
FLOSS products. Apache for Web server, PHP or Python as language for dynamic Web pages are still the 
leading tools in their branch for Internet application. 
3.1  Specific advantages for mass custom-made production.
FLOSS has specific advantages regarding the evolution of demand, improving quality and meeting norms.
Software quality.
 More than mere public research products, FLOSS programs were, first and foremost, tools developed by 
user-experts,  to meet their own needs.  The low quality of closed software packages and, especially,  the 
difficulty of making them evolve was one of the fundamental reasons for Richard Stallman’s initiative12. 
These user-experts are behind many libre software development initiatives (including Linux, Apache and 
Samba) and their improvement. And as far as these flagship software programs are concerned, this form of  
organization has obtained remarkable results in term of quality and quick improvements13. 
This is undoubtedly due to the free availability of the sources, allowing skilled users to test the software  
programs, to study their code and to correct it if they find errors. The higher the number of contributors, the  
greater the chance that one of them will find any error that may exist, and will know how to correct it. But 
libre programs are also tools (languages) and programming rules that make this reading possible. All this 
helps to guarantee minimum thresholds of robustness for the software. 
Other widely distributed libre programs are program development tools (compilers, such as GCC C/C++ 
compiler, development environment, such as Emacs or Eclipse). The reasons are threefold: they are tools  
used by computer professionals who are able and willing to develop or adapt their working tools, they are the 
first  tools  you  need  to  develop  software  programs,  and  their  efficiency  is  very  important  for  program 
efficiency. That is why FSF’s first products were such programs, and particularly the GCC compiler. 
Meeting norms.
 Co-operative work and the fact that the software programs are often a collection of simultaneously evolving 
small-scale  projects,  also  requires  that  the  communication  interface  should  be  made  public  and 
"normalized"14.
Open codes make it easier to check this compatibility and, if need be, to modify the software programs. It  
is also remarkable that, in order to avoid the reproduction of diverging versions of Unix, computer firms have 
set up organizations to guarantee the compatibility of the various versions and distribution of Linux. They  
also publish technical recommendations on how to program the applications so that they can work with this 
12 Stallman “invented” the concept of FLOSS, with the creation of the GNU/GPL license and of the Free  
Software  Foundation,  the  organization  which  produces  them;  see 
http://www.fsf.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html.  See  http://www.gnu.org/prep/standards.html  for  technical 
recommendations on how to program GNU software.
13 On the structure of libre development, besides Raymond (1998a, 1998b, 1999), one can also refer to  
Lakhani and von Hippel (2003). See Tzu-Ying and Jen-Fang (2004) for a survey and an analysis of the 
efficiency of on-line user communities, Bessen (2002) and Baldwin and Clark (2003) for a theoretical  
analysis of the impact of libre code architecture on the efficiency of libre development. The latter argue 
that libre may be seen as a new development "institution" (p. 35 et seq.).
14 In the sense that they respect public formats whose evolution is decided collectively. 
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system  in  the  same  spirit  as  the  POSIX  standard15.  Firms  use  libre  programs  as  professional  tools  to 
collectively coordinate the creation of components and software program bricks which are both reliable and,  
especially, "normalized". Up to now, this collective, normalized base has been lacking within the information 
technology industry (Dréan, 1996). This normalization of the components used to build "mass custom-made 
products" should help to improve the quality of this production, because the services based on them may be 
of better quality.
Based on the historical evolution of the computer industry, there are convergent signs suggesting that FLOSS 
is the industrial organization “of the Internet years”, on the condition that firms develop sustainable business,  
compatible with the way communities work. In the last  decade,  an abundant and growing literature has  
discussed this question.
3.2 Floss involvement and the role of users 
Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of commercial firm, either new entrants or incumbents, have decided 
to integrate FLOSS products in their  own specific offer or toolboxes, even investing by different means in 
FLOSS development.  Of  course  these  new  emerging  strategies  must  be  understood  in  the  light  of  IP  
protection prevailing in each market segment and the need to strengthen competitive advantages or to rely on  
new ones. 
Regarding the degree of involvement in FLOSS dynamics,  the more active actors seems to be found in 
sectors where software development and use is either a core activity or a crucial condition for performances,  
as it is the case for server manufacturers or architects of information systems (adoption of Linux by IBM, HP 
since the beginning of the years 2000). At the other extreme, the weakest involvement is found amongst 
hardware suppliers that can only feel concerned by FLOSS for compatibility and price purposes.
When FLOSS adoption is related to marginal aspects of differentiation, it  seems to have little impact on 
industrial structure and competition. This is generally the case for most of hardware producers, when hard-
soft-content  is  no  longer  bundled  (servers,  computers,  Personal  Communication  Tools,  DVD  and  MP3 
players...) 
Surprisingly, FLOSS diffusion impacts mainly firms in software based industries. This has to be understood 
regarding how their core competences have evolved and shifted significantly. Their main challenge is less 
and less to supply a “software solution” to a given problem at a given time, but increasingly to deal with  
short to long term uncertainty over IT system production and management. Users ask for solutions able to  
protect them against uncertainty, granting interoperability, bug resolution, the satisfaction of new needs and 
the integration of technical advances  . The trade-off between available solutions is not posed in terms of 
their cost of acquisition but of their “TCO” (total cost of ownership), in which the future costs and the costs  
for granting interoperability and adaptability have to be estimated. This is precisely what architects, business  
programs and platform producers sell to skilled users, aware of these problems and signals. On these markets 
the FLOSS organization seems to represent an asset for producers, who can display their involvement and 
succeed  in  building  sustainable  business  models  (see  the  examples  of  RedHat,  MySQL  or,  in  France 
Linagora). But, as explained before, this is only an asset if the market regards FLOSS as providing a value 
added to the product, i.e. if this brings the users a potential for increasing their utility. 
How and why may those different users contribute directly or indirectly to FLOSS projects? First of all,  
contribution  does  not  necessary  imply  code  development  but  can  take  various  forms  in  the  product 
development  and  improvement.  Users  have  to  be  considered  as  valuable  “sources  of  innovation”  (Von 
Hippel),  not  only  for  program testing  and  debugging  but  also  for  improving  the  product  usability  and 
performances. People decide to contribute if they get interested by the product, or if they have a problem, in  
which case they can either report the problem directly or through an intermediary, the supplier for instance,  
that allows the user to pass from a passive to an active use of the project.
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What  seems  clear  from a  rather  qualitative  analysis,  and  was  formally  demonstrated  in  Jullien  and  
Zimmermann (2009), is that the skill of the users matters for understanding the level of firms’ involvement in 
FLOSS. When users are naive, firms may use FLOSS, but only for price reasons, in the same way as they 
could use freeware. The more VH the users are, the more complex the strategies involving FLOSS, and the 
greater firms’ involvement and participation. In some cases, when users are VH, firms may even produce  
FLOSS and lead the community, as do Ada Core Technology for Ada 2005 and MySQL AB for MySQL data 
bases. But in any case, FLOSS is regarded as open source software. This means that firms use FLOSS for 
technical reasons (sustainability, flexibility) and for innovative reasons (increasing the speed and quality of 
feedback).
4. What we can learn from the markets?
As seen  before,  there  is  a  wide  diversity  of  actors  in  the  industry in  terms of  both products  and  size.  
Successive waves of innovations and company strategies have led to a progressive reshaping of the industry 
borders and structure. For example, Internet has impacted the software production, pushing firms to integrate  
more  services  in  their  offers,  designing  new ways  of  selling  software  bases  applications,  such  as  Saas  
(software as a service) (Cusumano, 2004, pp 86-127; Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, 2007),  However, the 
foundations  of  the  industry  have  remained  unchanged,  since  those  described  by  Gérard-Varet  & 
Zimmermann (1985), Zimmermann (1995), Steinmueller (1996), and Cusumano (2004): IT products are built 
by assembling hardware and software units in a given architecture, and these products (isolated or integrated  
into  networks)  are  used  as  parts  of  information  systems  and solutions.  On  the  basis  of  such  technical  
organization, it is then possible to distinguish three large types of “vertical specialization”: i.  component  
producers,  ii.  computers  and  IT devices  suppliers,  iii.  software editors  and service  companies  providing 
16  In reference to the notion of « frontier-users » put forward by Kogut and Metiu (2001)
17  With the aim to provide “a computer for each pupil”: http://www.ordina13.com/, http://www.ordi35.fr/




All these segments are concerned with software production, as even chipset manufacturers have to deal with 
the operating systems embeded in the machine integrating their component. They provide drivers for these  
operating systems, and their incentive to use and develop FLOSS drivers for free operating systems (such as 
Linux) is a growing function of such systems market size. Since the beginning of the 2000s, some firms like  
ATI indeed offer such compatible drivers. But, this remains a marginal contribution, and should not have any 
immediate  serious  impact  on  the  structure  of  the  FLOSS  development  organization. So  we  will  not 
investigate further the strategies towards FLOSS in this segment of the industry.
Remain what is traditionally defined as the hardware part (the machines) and the software part (software and  
services), with, in between the operating system.
4.1. The hardware.
Hardware  is  increasingly  various,  from  mainframes  to  netbooks,  and  from dedicated  devices  (personal 
communication  tools,  video  game  or  music  players)  to  the  “swiss  knife  machines”  which  are  modern 
computers.
Looking at these markets from the dominant user skill prism helps to understand the  adoption of FLOSS 
within the industry.
1. In the  servers market,  producers have habitually provided proprietary solutions with proprietary Unix19. 
Here suppliers are dealing with highly-skilled VH clients that  can make an essential  contribution in the  
context  of  FLOSS opening.  The rise of  PC servers  has  permitted some users  to  avoid such a  bundling 
problem; moreover, using Linux allows a cheaper offer (vertical advantage) reusing Unix programs (content) 
portfolio. Thus some firms have been able to widen the servers market from VH users capable of managing 
their systems by themselves to KM clients, sensitive to prices, but also to the quality of a PC server fitted out  
with Linux. So new entries have been experienced like the Cobalt20 one, but the main actors of the Unix 
“world” have also rapidly developed their own offers, cutting down the sources of vertical differentiation21.
2.  The segment of netbooks, and  low price computers (LPC) is a mass market where naïve clients are the 
driving force behind demand, and competition is overall based on prices. When Asus entered the market with 
its eee-PC, it used Linux for price reasons, because Microsoft Windows Vista was too costly in terms of 
resources needed and price to be competitive. Since, considering the success of this market, Microsoft has 
designed a specific, downgraded version of Windows XP for these computers22. It is worth noting that, since 
the middle of 2007, Dell proposes Ubuntu Linux distribution on ones of its first price laptops23. 
3.  Between these two cases there is the  high quality computers  (HQC) market, ie computers for firms or 
computers used to play games, computers requiring good, up-to-date performances. In that segment, exigent 
users, or frontier, KM users seems to be dominant.  It is worth noting that in this desktop market, the main  
push in favour of  open source,  for  the time being,  is  driven by organizations or  institutions (which we 
consider as VH users) that take decisions to equip a large number of end-users. Examples are the French  
“Assemblée Nationale” (French Congress) that has contracted with a service company to install Linux on all  
the computers  provided to MPs24,  or the initiatives of the Nigerian25 and Macedonian26 governments  for 
schools, or in the industry, the French automaker Peugeot27. 
So,  today, HQC producers may find it hard to switch from Windows to Linux, because this would mean  
either acquiring new skills (OS management and improvement), or sub-contracting this maintenance to Linux 
19  See West (2003) for a full discussion of FLOSS strategies in that sector .
20  Cobalt  was  bought  by  SUN,  which  dissolved  the  products  into  its  own  offer.  See 
http://www.sun.com/hardware/serverappliances/eol.html
21  It worth noting that, on the contrary, SUN, being the leader on the UNIX market, has been reluctant to adopt Linux 
and is today the server constructor which has the most difficulties to adapt its business model, with recurrent losses.
22Eee-PC has been the “most wanted 2007 Christmas gift”, according to the constructor, http://eeepc.asus.com/global/
23http://www.dell.com/content/topics/segtopic.aspx/linux_3x?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs
24  http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/software/0,39044164,61970345,00.htm




editors (RedHat, SuSE,...) which may lead to another dependence and to conflict relations with the dominant 
provider.  Nevertheless,  a  possible  future  evolution  in  this  sense  is  likely  to  arise  from the  pressure  of 
corporate and VH customers becoming more aware of the potentialities of switching to FLOSS. It is worth  
noting that the Linux offered by HP is part of the enterprise offers branch28. In the near future most of the 
HQCs will probably switch to debundling their machines from the associated OS, to  segment more their  
offer between VH users with the Linux offer and KM users with Windows.
4. Dedicate digital devices represent another intermediate case with less skilled customers (KM+N) and a weak 
degree of involvement on the part  of commercial actors into FLOSS, and mainly  for compatibility and 
absorptive capacity purpose.
At  one extreme, in  the games consoles  segment  but  also to  a lesser  extent  in the music  player  market,  
proprietary formats have introduced, a strong bundle of hardware-software-content and FLOSS products are 
non-existent. Thanks to the MP3 standard or new existing or emerging open standards like Ogg, new entries  
are always possible in segments like the music players market, but the main actors, like Apple, remain on a 
strict proprietary strategy. On the contrary, barriers remain high on the video game players market due to the  
scarcity of independent games capable of running on Linux, unlike the PS2, Xbox and other proprietary 
standards games. Moreover, when they exist, such games seem harder to obtain for simple users. 
On  the  contrary,  there  are  lots  of  FLOSS  products  for  Personal  Communication  Tools,  or  Mobile 
Computers29. Some are proposed by VH users, other by the constructors: :
- if the leader, Nokia only soldl an Internet tablet based on Linux and a development community30, there are 
lots of open-source projects around Symbian (partly owned by Nokia, partly by Sony-Ericsson)31, mainly 
dedicated to tools for developing applications (libraries, development tools, etc.) and Samsung proposes the 
first smart phones based on Linux32;
- the PDA Operating system editor Palmsource is working on the integration of its product on a Linux kernel 
on its products33.
For the same reasons as for PC computers,  we hardly see naïve or KM people switch from an installed 
operating system to a FLOSS one. So constructors will continue to drive the market and decide what they 
integrate  in  their  offer.  Implementing  Linux  on  PCT  devices  may  appear  as  a  good  strategy  to  limit 
differentiation to the core competences of the manufacturers. Operating systems are not at the heart of the  
products  differentiation  which  is  more  based  on ergonomic aspects  and hardware  characteristics.  In  the 
absence of a still established de facto standard, as it stands in the PC market, Linux is to be considered by 
PCT suppliers, as it is free of charge and benefits from a community of developer-users capable to develop  
new features  and new products  outside any proprietary control.  In fact,  similarly to  the PC market,  the  
challenge is the choice of a platform (Operating System) to build the product.  Palm is also good example of  
a company which after having sold its OS division, is now turning toward Linux. 
4.2. The software.
1. In the software platform market, the Linux distribution market is another very good illustration of 
the key role of the demand. Linux publlishers, like RedHat, SuSE, Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft), have  
been among the first commercial actors to enter the market using FLOSS. This could appear to be  obvious  
on a mass market with rather naive users and a significant price-based competition. But today, the retail 
store sales of OS packages represent a negligible part of the revenue of such firms34, and a major part is 
28  http://h71028.www7.hp.com/enterprise/cache/309906-0-0-0-121.html
29  See, for instance, http://tuxmobil.org/ a web site dedicated to Linux and mobile computers.
30  Nokia  770  Internet  Tablet:  http://www.nokiausa.com/770/1,7841,feat:1,00.html.  Development  community: 
http://www.maemo.org/
31  In June 2008, Nokia announced to be acquiring the whole share of Symbian and open source it under  
Eclipse license. See the Symbian foundation Web site: http://www.symbianfoundation.org/
32  http://linuxdevices.com/news/NS2854558742.html 
33 Palm and Linux: http://news.com.com/2102-1041_3-6175171.html?tag=st.util.print. The web site dedicated by Palm 
to open source: http://www.palmsource.com/opensource/.
34  RedHat stopped this activity (see financial report 2006, p. 31); the consumer market (including distributors, OEM 
sales, e-commerce and Club) represented 2.54M€ (45% of the total earnings) showing a 23.4% decrease for Mandriva 
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targeted to the business market.
One might explain this fact by the development of broadband connection thanks to ADSL. But we believe a 
more important explanation lies in the skills of the users and the construction of the offer. Consumers buy 
computers  with  an  OS already installed  and  few of  them are  skilled  enough to  install  a  different  one.  
Additionally there are no incentives to do so because the pre-installed OS has already been paid for with the 
computer.  So,  the  diffusion  of  FLOSS  OS  on  desktop/laptop  PCs  depends  more  on  the  strategies  of  
constructors, as discussed above, than on direct installation by users. And for VH people wanting to install  
Linux on their PC, other, more technically oriented distributions exist, like Debian, and there is no need to  
pay for these distributions, available for download on the Web.
On the emerging OS for PC server market, things work differently. Most of the users, of VH or KM type, are 
aware of the technical questions  involved in installing and configuring an OS. It is  also easier to buy a 
machine without an operating system installed, and the relative price of the OS is lower. FLOSS gives them 
access to a cheaper but also more open and more adaptable Unix-like operating system, than they could find 
in the traditional Unix offer. This gave FLOSS OS publishers an undeniable competitive advantage, at least  
until that server constructors started to offer PC servers with Linux.
2. In the business software market, the more skilled the users are, in terms of software development 
skills, and (although this is a lesser driving force) in terms of cexpressing functionality requirements, the 
more FLOSS concepts and industrial related offers are likely to spread.
It is clear that the use of open source business software, enabling savings on the cost of licenses, offers a  
price advantage. Moreover, the fact that the customer can evaluate the product without buying a license is 
also an advantage in terms of dissemination. It may even be compulsory when dominant players already exist  
on the market (such as the database market where MySQL proposes software products competing against  
those of Oracle, IBM and Microsoft who represent more than 80 % of the market) or when customers are 
highly sensitive to price (such as the ERP market which increasingly concerns SMEs and where open-source  
products like ERP5 or tiny ERP are now available). This strategy also enables the association of a corporate  
brand  with  a  product,  therefore  increasing  the  notoriety  of  the  firm  through  distribution  of  the  latter. 
Moreover, on these technical markets, especially when the customers are developers, availability of the code 
promotes  cooperation.  The  producer  approves  the  contributions,  ensures  stability  of  the  tool  and  helps 
developers  to  use  it.  If  some  individual  contributor  becomes  important  (in  terms  of  contribution 
volume/quality/innovative aspect), s/he may be hired by a producer, with reduced recruitment costs and risks 
(ACT  or  MySQL  but  also  some  small  services  companies  are  using  this  method).  By  contributing  to 
innovation, the developers (and possibly companies using the tool), are therefore guaranteed that their needs 
will be taken into account more quickly and integrated into the product (which is a fundamental factor in 
reducing costs, according to Von Hippel 1988).
Obviously, capitalizing on existing products is more difficult, even if, as Muselli (2002) explained, with the  
entire control of the software , a dual license strategy can be set up to sell the program when requested by the  
customers  (because,  for  example,  they  want  to  integrate  it  in  a  larger,  closed,  package).  This  is  what  
companies like Qt or MySQL offer. But, today, the main source of revenue again comes from services, more 
precisely  what  we  call  the  “3A services”  (assistance,  assurance  and  adaptation  to  the  use).  Otherwise, 
adaptation  services  must  be  significant  enough  to  finance  development  of  the  product.  Therefore,  the 
objective is to transform a handicap (significant investments) into a commercial advantage, by increasing the 
business feedback from users and by considering openness as a way to reduce transaction costs and as a  
signal of quality. Currently, the main evolution for those firms is to switch from a demand pull strategy 
(functionalities are developed to stimulate/create the demand) to an 'on-demand' development (development 
when required and paid for or carried out by the users).
This  explains  why  open  source  business  products  are  developed  mainly  in  “business”  software  (ERP, 
computer infrastructure software like compilers), where users ready to pay for configuration, maintenance or  
assistance services are numerous. But the scope could easily extend to many technical/professional software 
activities.
3. As  far  as  the  services  of  the “architects”  market is  concerned,  as  Horn  (2004)  points  out, 
assembling components requires access to the source codes (problem of compatibility), and their adaptation  
to different needs (of users and other components).  They must be available in the form of open-source 
software ( therefore legally modifiable).
The competitive advantage in using free software, in addition to price, is therefore  the ability to offer an 
assembled set of components with greater interoperability, which should increase the quality of the final 
2005-2006 fiscal year; SuSE has been bought by Novell, so these revenues are diluted.
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product, on a market where the quality of services is one of the recurrent problems (see De Bandt, 1998).  
Revenues are generated by assembling and adaptation services,  as is  the case for any traditional service 
company.
The only uncertainty about the model concerns the availability of the components: who will develop them 
and who will maintain them? Moreover, the customers of these companies may already have (proprietary) 
programs installed that need to be taken into account. In the end, an open source strategy could even be a  
guarantee of means (maximum use of free software), but not a guarantee of the results (use of only free  
software), unless the customer requests this, since in this situation, he keeps the last word.
Two kinds of firms use FLOSS today : newcomers who specialize in FLOSS architecture, using FLOSS as 
vertical (price) and horizontal differentiation asset, and incumbents, such as IBM for its service activities35. 
Traditional service firms like Cap Gemini are more agnostic with regard to the technologies used and the 
intellectual property regime involved. They will generally follow the customers' demand which depends on 
their  ability  to  keep  up  with  the  development  of  the  project.  These  customers  are  most  often  large  
organizations, skilled computer users that are receptive to the opportunity to integrate the most advanced 
software components, developed under open licenses. So they are becoming increasingly involved in FLOSS 
as the market grows and matures36.
Table 1 below summarize the main type of users likely to be found in each sub-sector of the IT industry. 
Table 1. The dominant user type in each IT sub-sector.
Actors/  
products
Dominant user type Comments
Components 
VH
Component producers supply hardware manufacturers, aware of the quality and quality-price aspects of the 
components they will use, as well as the effects of brand reputation of these latter as a signal of quality for 
their own products.
Servers VH The clients are computer-literate people, able to express needs in technical terms, to develop software for  
their own needs, and to innovate by themselves.
High Quality 
Computers 
KM HQC users are somewhat less computer-literate than server users; they can be characterized as “intensive 
frontier users”. So the market is looking at a good performance-to-price ratio.
Low Price 
Computers 
N +. KM  LPC is a mass market; users have no particular skills except in the case of intermediation by a 
“prescriber”.
PCT   N + KM PCT and players are relatively mass markets, but some advanced users (more in the PCT field and 
particularly in the PDA market) can play a constructive role in the development of new features. 
Players N
Platform 
producers KM + N
For the OS, as for hardware components, most of the end-users buy a computer with an OS already 
installed. So the actual users in our sense of the term are computer manufacturers, service companies and 
sophisticated end-users capable of installing an alternative operating system for their proper use or the use 
of their customers.
On other platforms (database, middleware), the users are also computer manufacturers, service companies 




VH/KM depending on the 
markets
In the business solutions market, users are professionals. They are able to make a technical evaluation of  
the product, to carry out trials and tests. This means that people may have skills in the functional domain  
(what they want, how the software works), and sometimes in the technical one (able to adapt or develop 
software to meet their own needs, especially in the tools for computer professionals market).
Architects N (+VH) Large firms and organizations include very sophisticated users (IT division). SMEs or corporate divisions,  
at local or sectorial level, are clients of very heterogeneous but rather low IT skills. However, clients may 
be quite precise in the definition of the services they need, and so in the specification of the application 
characteristics.
35  As explained by  Slatter (1992), one of the main strategies for newcomers in technological markets is 
technological differentiation. Basing its offer on new FLOSS products can be seen as a way for new 
service companies to differentiate.
36  In 2005 Gartner forecasted that « 2008, 95 percent of Global 2000 organizations will have formal open-
source  acquisition  and  management  strategies »  (http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?
doc_cd=125868)
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 (from Jullien & Zimmermann 2009).
Empirical observation about firms'  involvement in FLOSS development can be summarize as so:  in the 
fields  where  dominant  user's  skill  is  either  high  or  very  low,  firms  have  invested  into  FLOSS.  When  
dominant user's skill is intermediate, the dominant design remains that of the classical proprietary model. 
More precisely, when dominant user's skill is low, competition is price-based and FLOSS helps to provide a  
cheap solution. When dominant user's skill is high, competition is on quality, services and scalability, and 
FLOSS because it is modular, helps to design (so with complementary investments from firms), a better 
offer. But between this two polar cases, for dominant user rewarding quality for a low-medium price, FLOSS 
may not be a good alternative to proprietary solutions. 
As shown by Jullien & Zimmermann (2011), when dominant user's skill is high, the variation of investment  
into FLOSS development and communities among firms, can be explained, in the spirit of Teece (1986),  
Teece et al (1997).
As far as business packages are concerned, the specific asset of the producer lies in its package knowledge 
and in its capacity to manage the dynamics of evolution. This makes the open sourcing of a software the 
specific asset of the firm which owns it:  on the technology markets where the customers are computing 
developers,  revealing  the  code  facilitates  cooperation.  The  producer  organizes  the  collaboration  in  a 
“symbiotic”  relationship  (using  the  terms  of  Dahlander  et  Magnusson,  2005).  Developers  (possibly 
companies using the tool), by providing their own innovations, are thereby assured that their needs will be 
taken into account more rapidly and integrated into the product, a crucial point to reduce their costs (von 
Hippel, 1988); from the producer’s point of view, this decrease the R&D cost as the users provide him/her  
with new feature requirements and, more original, implementation; on the other hand, only the one who  
integrates contributions is  capable of verifying and of guaranteeing their correct  functioning and to help 
clients to use it. So, a FLOSS based package model means that the firms which publish the software remain 
heavily involved in its development in order to control it. As their core competence lies on the management  
of the software edited, the companies should only invest in the software they edit, and the involvement of  
salaried developers in other projects should not be encouraged.
As far as architects are concerned, to be able to integrate knowledge and innovation from the open-source 
communities, they have to develop internally efficient capabilities of absorption, an essential condition to 
capitalize  and internalize the communities’  contribution  and the users’  feedbacks to  improve their  own 
product quality. Dahlander et Magnusson (2008) working on the relations between firms and open-source  
communities show that those firms need “to develop sufficient absorptive capacity to benefit from external 
developments, not only to identify useful external knowledge, but also to assimilate and apply it”. This is  
what has been called a “commensalistic approach” (Dahlander et Magnusson, 2005). This corresponds to the 
more general assertion from Cohen et Levinthal (1989, 1990) about the necessity for a firm to make internal  






5  Conclusion. Lessons for open innovation regimes.
The FLOSS movement  has sometimes been presented as  a  canonical  model of  production for  the open  
innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003), and even for the knowledge society. If so, open development may 
develop in fields where users are skilled enough to initiate the development of open knowledge and have 
enough market power to force the traditional producers to shift to an open model. The major risk in this 
model is of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs, discouraging individual participation through over-
control or non-cooperative behavior.
These conditions being respected, the open IP regime can be seen as a very efficient solution to the 
37 http://www.capgemini.com/services-and-solutions/by-
industry/retail/alliances/ for  classical  alliance,  and 
http://searchsystemschannel.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid99
_gci1261207,00.html with those done with open source world.
15
Schumpeterian dilemma, insofar as it permits a wide diffusion of knowledge, while favoring innovation, as  
producers are encouraged to contribute to the development of the product they use/sell.
This regime could be called the “VH open innovation regime”, in reference to Von Hippel’s seminal  
work on users as innovators (von Hippel, 1988). Open initiatives have been launched in many industries,  
such as biotech, remote sensing and chip design. Their chances of success are usually evaluated in terms of 
the motivation of the participants and the stability of the “community”. Our contribution argues for more  
economic aspects to be taken into account. 
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